






Rival Concepts of Courage: MacIntyrean Enquiry
Abstract
Aristotle’s thoughts about courage in Nicomachean	Ethics remain the most common topic of 
discussion about the virtue. However, if Alasdair MacIntyre’s enquiry of virtues is applied, 
we start to wonder if we have only fragments of that ancient concept of courage in liberal 
societies today. The images of courage change. We can talk about Aristotelian insights and 
tell stories about medieval knights, but current tradition and its prominent moral charac-
ters shape our comprehension and exercise of virtues. A MacIntyrean threefold approach 
to virtue with respect to a) practice, b) narrative unity of life and c) tradition reveals two 
rival concepts of courage: the virtue of courage of excellence and the virtue of courage of 
efficiency. Which one we will cheer for and which one will prevail depends upon the kind of 




































emotivism and utilitarianism prevalent in language and behaviour of modern 
liberal	societies	today	(MacIntyre	2007).	The	Aristotelian	tradition	(either	Ar-




























el	of	moral	conduct	 in	 the	respective	society,	 then,	 in	MacIntyre’s	opinion,	





concept	of	the courage of efficiency. 
But	 do	managers	 represent	 an	 image	of	 our	 heroes?	Managers	 do	 endorse	
economic	battlefields,	manage	the	risks,	protect	people	from	economic	crises	


















excellence	overcome	 the	 need	 to	 prioritise	 efficiency?	Are	 the	Aristotelian	
and	liberal	tradition	incommensurable,	as	MacIntyre	claims	(MacIntyre	1988,	
1999b,	2007)?	MacIntyre	regards	justice,	honesty,	intellectual	virtues,	cour-







tic	virtue	needed	to	sustain	that	what	 is	considered	good in tradition, good 





















temological	apparatus	 inherited	 in	specific	 traditional	can	moral	statements	
be	understood,	and	only	there	could	they	receive	moral	evaluation	(see	Ma-
cIntyre	 1997).	Each	 tradition	 has	 a	 different	 catalogue	 of	 virtues,	 but	Ma-
cIntyre	believes	that	there	is	a	particular	list	of	virtues	that	are	crucial	for	any	









































Societies	with	 the	 inability	 to	handle	 conflicts	 require	 from	 their	members	









In	 one	 particular	 paragraph,	MacIntyre	 offers	 us	 his	 very	 rare	 but	 unique	
thoughts	about	courage,	where	he	emphasises	the	importance	of	care	in	defin-
ing	this	virtue.	He	says:


























According	 to	MacIntyre’s	 classic	 book	Dependent Rational Animals,  there  
are	two	prerequisites	to	establish	a	community	that	supports	the	development	
of	a	virtuous	character.	Those	are:	acknowledgment of dependence upon oth-
ers	and	allowing	people	to	be	independent practical reasoners.	Since	the	vir-




terdependence	 in	 one’s	 community	 are	 essential	 features	 for	 a	 courageous	
attitude.	There	are	no	independent	heroes,	individuals	above	the	community.	
Courageous	people	might	outgrow	the	limitation	of	their	tradition	by	reason-






























titude	 required	 by	 relativism	 (see	Macan	 2012,	 pp.	 5–8).	And	 that	 has	 an	
enormously	strong	impact	on	the	epistemic	attitude	of	contemporary	man	and	
their	agency.	Why	would	anybody	risk	 their	own	 life	 for	 the	sake	of	some	
concept	of	a	“good”	purpose,	which	could	be	interpreted	in	many	other	ways?	





































































reason	 to	 be	 disloyal	 to	 oneself.	Apprehending	what	 should	 be	 the	 proper	
answer	for	each	situation	does	not	mean	that	the	moral	character	ought	to	let	
























of	 those	conflicts	 suggests	a	 lack	of	self-consciousness.	Although	aware	of	
different	 possible	 solutions	 to	 a	 problem,	 the	 coward	will	 tend	 to	 take	 the	












































Furthermore,	 the	 scientist	 must	 willingly	 engage	 themselves	 in	 the	 stages	
of	 a	 severe	 epistemological	 crisis	 at	 first	 with	 no	 clear	 idea,	working	 per-




breakthrough	that	will	provide	the	answers.1 A bold determination is needed. 











































































tion of the best means to the good purposes is an important task that needs to 


































Calculated	bravery	offers	 something	 to	 receive	 something	 in	 return.	Do ut 
des!	 It	 is	 a	 reciprocal	 transaction.	 If	 a	 top-level	 fundraising	manager	 in	 a	
charity	organisation	requires	a	high-level	salary	as	an	exclusive	condition	for	
employment,	 their	motivation	 is	 in	 receiving	 external	 reciprocal	 goods,	 as	
the	condition	is	defined	without	relation	to	the	meaning	of	the	organisation’s	
battlefields	 (see	Grant	 2007,	 pp.	 393–417).	 If	 their	 exclusive	 requirements	
for	 employment	 are	 down	 to	 the	working	 environment,	 then	 their	motives	









Dedication	 to	 the	 inner	 goods,	 however,	 is	 neither	 absolute	 nor	 exclusive,	
since	external	goods	can	be	desired	by	the	person	driven	by	achieving	excel-
lence.	The	fundamental	difference	is	that	external	goods	do	not	represent	the	


































Managers	 are	 thorough	 in	 methods	 of	 risk	 management	 to	 recognise	 and	




















The	 person	 in	 such	 a	work	 ambience	 is	 invited	 to	make	 a	 decision	 either	
to	become	an	authority	and	impose	their	subjective	preferences	or	to	accept	
manipulation	by	others.	Even	 if	 the	 initial	 intention	of	 the	manager,	 in	 the	
environment	without	discussions,	 is	not	manipulation,	because	 they	can	be	
convinced	in	the	goods	chosen	by	their	preferences,	it	is	a	consequence	for	
others.	Two	colleagues	do	not	have	 the	 same	virtue	of	 courage	 if	 the	only	
one	recognises	the	goal	as	something	good.	Not	all	managers	can	choose	the	
goals	they	accept	because	the	freedom	of	choice	depends	upon	the	personal	






goods	 that	 all	 participants	 of	 an	 organisation,	 institution	 and	 practice,	 are	































“What	 then	 is	 the	 good	 of	 each?	 Surely	 that	 for	whose	 sake	 everything	 else	 is	 done.”	 (NE	
1097a15)
In	 the	Aristotelian	worldview,	consequence	 could	 not	 be	 simply	 translated	
into the  purpose	 of	 an	 action.	Therefore,	 goods	 created	 in	practice	 are	 the	
purpose	of	the	manager’s	work,	while	salary	is	a	consequence	of	the	organisa-
tion’s	effort	to	achieve	that	purpose.	
We	 can	 summarise	 at	 least	 four	 epistemological	 prerequisites	 for	 people	


































act	of	“true	care	and	concern	 for	others”	 (MacIntyre	2007,	p.	155).	At	 the	
same	time,	MacIntyre	highlights	that	the	liberal	tradition	and	its	“promoters	of	
ethics	of	emotivism”	subdue	the	Aristotelian	concept	of	virtue	to	the	skill,	to	












In	 liberal	 communities,	 the	 courage	 of	 efficiency	 is	 promoted	 by	 its	 own	
prominent	character,	the	manager.	They	are	the	role	models	for	risk	manage-



































at the same time.
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Aristotelove misli o hrabrosti u Nikomahovoj etici i dalje su najučestalije štivo rasprava o 
vrlini. Međutim, ako primijenimo razmatranje o vrlinama Alasdaira MacIntyrea, postavlja se 
pitanje o tome raspolažemo li u suvremenim liberalnim društvima tek fragmentima drevnog poj-
ma hrabrosti. Slika hrabrosti izmijenila se. Možemo govoriti o aristotelovskim uvidima i pričati 
o srednjovječnim vitezovima,  ali sadašnja su tradicija i karakter njena morala ti što oblikuju 
naše razumijevanje i korištenje vrlina. MacIntyreovski trostruki pristup vrlinama, uzimajući u 
obzir a) praksu, b) pripovjedno jedinstvo života i c) tradiciju, otkriva dva suparnička pojma 
hrabrosti: vrlina hrabrosti izvrsnosti i vrlinu hrabrosti učinkovitosti. Koja će prevladati ovisi o 








Konkurrierende Begriffe von Tapferkeit: 
macintyresche	Betrachtungsweise
Zusammenfassung
Aristoteles‘ Gedanken über die Tapferkeit in Nikomachische	Ethik bleiben weiterhin die häu-
figste Stätte der Diskussion über die Tugend. Wenn wir indessen unsere Erörterung über die Tu-
genden bei Alasdair MacIntyre ändern, wirft sich die Frage auf, ob uns in modernen liberalen 
Gesellschaften nicht mehr als Fragmente des uralten Tapferkeitsbegriffs zu Gebote stehen. Das 
Bild von der Tapferkeit hat sich verändert. Wir können über aristotelische Einsichten und über 
mittelalterliche Ritter reden, aber es sind die gegenwärtige Tradition und der Charakter ihrer 
Moral, die unser Verständnis und unseren Gebrauch von Tugenden prägen. Die macintyresche 
dreifache Herangehensweise an Tugenden unter Berücksichtigung von a) Praxis, b) narrativer 
Einheit des Lebens und c) Tradition offenbart zwei konkurrierende Begriffe von Tapferkeit: die 
Tugend der Tapferkeit des Vorzüglichseins sowie die Tugend der Tapferkeit des Wirksamseins. 
Welcher Begriff die Oberhand gewinnt, hängt davon ab, was für eine Tapferkeit wir als unsere 
zweite Natur der Gewohnheit annehmen.
Schlüsselwörter
Alasdair	 MacIntyre,	 Tapferkeit,	 Vorzüglichkeit,	Wirksamkeit,	 narrative	 Einheit	 des	 Lebens,	
Praxis,	Tradition
Anita Calvert
Les concepts antagonistes de courage : l’analyse macintyrienne
Résumé
Les pensées d’Aristote sur le courage dans l’Éthique	à	Nicomaque constituent encore le lieu de 
débat le plus commun sur les vertus. Cependant, si l’on applique les considérations de Alasdair 
MacIntyre, se pose la question de savoir si l’on dispose, au sein des sociétés libérales contempo-
raines, uniquement de fragments du concept ancien de courage. L’image du courage a changé. 
Il est possible de parler des idées aristotéliciennes et des chevaliers du Moyen-Âge, mais c’est 
bien la tradition actuelle et le caractère de sa morale qui façonnent notre compréhension et 
l’usage des vertus. L’approche à trois niveaux de MacIntyre des vertus prenant en considération 
a) la pratique, b) l’unité narrative de la vie et c) la tradition, dévoile deux concepts antagonistes 
du courage : la vertu du courage en tant qu’excellence et la vertu du courage en tant qu’effi-
cience. Lequel de ces concepts l’emportera dépend du courage que nous adopterons en tant que 
seconde nature d’habitude.
Mots-clés
Alasdair	MacIntyre,	courage,	excellence,	efficience,	unité	narrative	de	la	vie,	pratique,	tradition
